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The citizens of many countries in the world, particularly of South Africa, are experiencing the 
collapse of the social order in their country as a result of certain circumstances. This fact of 
social disintegration has led educationists to again examine the nature and contents of the social 
contract that the South African citizenry has entered into. In secular states, the social contract 
should at least be rooted in two ethical principles, namely trust and humanistic versions of 
the Golden Rule. Analysis of the South African social contract demonstrates this point, and 
also shows how a positive modus vivendi [living together] can flow from the recognition and 
application of these two principles. The upcoming generations should therefore be educated 
to understand the nature and content of their social contract, the two ethical principles, and 
the need for a positive modus vivendi based on their particular social contract.
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Gewelddadige samelewings: Die opvoeding van die opkomende geslagte rakende hulle 
sosiale kontrak. Die burgers van baie lande in die wêreld, dog in die besonder dié van Suid-Afrika, 
ervaar tans die ineenstorting van die sosiale orde in hulle land as gevolg van die inspeling van baie 
faktore. Hierdie toestand van sosiale disintegrasie het opvoeders en opvoedkundiges daartoe 
gelei om andermaal die aard en die inhoud van die sosiale kontrak waartoe Suid-Afrikaners 
hulle verbind het, te ondersoek. Die sosiale kontrak behoort in sekulêre state minstens in twee 
etiese beginsels gewortel te wees, naamlik vertroue en humanistiese weergawes van die Goue 
Reël. ’n Ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse sosiale kontrak illustreer hierdie punt, en toon ook 
hoedat ’n positiewe modus vivendi [saamlewe] kan voortvloei uit die erkenning en toepassing 
van hierdie twee beginsels. Die komende geslagte behoort derhalwe opgevoed te word om 
die aard en inhoud van hulle sosiale kontrak, die twee etiese beginsels waarop dit behoort te 
berus, en die noodsaaklikheid van ’n positiewe modus vivendi te verstaan en toe te pas.
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to read online.
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The need for societies to revisit their social contracts
The Republic of Georgia has recently (2013) launched an advertising campaign on South African 
radio in which it attempted to entice South Africans to emigrate to Georgia (Radiosondergrense 
[RSG] 2013; also cf. Prasad 2012). The advertisements capitalised on the dangers of living 
in South Africa by mentioning that around 16 000 people had lost their lives in 2012 due to 
violence, including brutal farm murders and assaults.  Whilst this campaign seems to have been 
opportunistic, it cannot be denied that South Africa has become one of the most violent societies in 
the world. A large number of people are killed per annum and many women and children suffer 
rape and sexual abuse. The population also suffers from alleged police brutality, as evidenced 
by the Marikana massacre, the death of Andries Tatane near Ficksburg and the incidents in 2013 
where police officers dragged crime suspects behind police vehicles (see Mail & Guardian 2013).
A perusal of only two newspapers published on Wednesday 27 March 2013 revealed the 
following atrocities that seem to demonstrate the hazardous nature of living in South Africa: 
the rape, mutilation and killing of a 14-year-old, atrocities in the name of Satanism, corruption, 
police brutality, the story of men who do not father their children (see The Star 2013:4–5, 8), the 
police minister to pay damages, rape, brutality the result of entitlement, and the rise of religious 
intolerance (see The Citizen 2013:6, 12–13). According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 
commercial farmers in South Africa are in greater danger of being killed than the police: 91.8 per 
100 000 of the population as against the police’s 51.0 per 100 000 (RSG 27 March 2013).
Whilst this brief description seems to provide evidence of an unsafe situation in South Africa, it 
should not be thought that other countries are much safer. As will be shown, developed societies 
such as those of the United States of America and Norway have recently similarly suffered from 
anti-social behaviour. The situation in South Africa is not unique, but serves as inspiration for 
educationalists to examine the problem and to search for a solution.
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The above seems to suggest that social cohesion has 
increasingly deteriorated because of a lack of understanding 
of what a social contract amongst citizens entails. Young 
people of the early 21st century seem to be growing up under 
the mistaken impression that each of us has to only look 
after him- or herself. Each individual has to cope as best as 
possible in the social ‘jungle out there’, and this has resulted 
in an escalation of anti-social behaviour. The situation has 
been exacerbated by the advent of the postmodern zeitgeist 
characterised by, inter alia, a feeling of alienation and social 
collapse (Wilber 2000:12).
The current postmodern attitude of value relativism has most 
likely made a contribution to this selfish and self-centred 
attitude. According to Parkin (2011:154–155), people have 
a supermarket of values at their disposal, and its impact on 
the inner self of disorganised and vulnerable individuals1 has 
become the criterion for choosing values (De Botton 2012:95). 
According to Bower (2005:181, 254), it is a tenet of the 
postmodern perspective that people create personal meaning 
in regard to their identity, value and purpose. McGrath 
(2005:218) concurs: reacting to the simplistic statements of 
the Enlightenment, postmodernity has stressed the limits to 
human knowledge and encouraged a toleration of those who 
diverge from the ‘one size fits all’ philosophy of modernity. 
The world in which we live is seen as a place where nothing 
is certain, guaranteed or unquestionably given. It has become 
fashionable, Needleman (2008:61) contends, to deny the 
existence of absolutes in the ethical sphere. All morality 
is seen as relative to time, place, ethnicity, religion, social 
class, nationality and so on. The postmodern zeitgeist, says 
Needleman (2008:108), dispirits people with ethical cynicism 
and relativism. It reduces every viewpoint, every norm and 
conviction, however firmly believed by some, to a temporary 
phenomenon, an event of a transient nature. Everything is 
seen as historically determined and historically relative, 
in other words, everything is relativised (Van der Walt 
2007:178).
According to Olthuis (2012), some people demand that 
we move beyond life view exclusivism into an era beyond 
concern with world views. Life is seen as more than 
logic; there is a limit to knowledge; knowledge is never 
disinterested, neutral, a-temporal or a-spatial. According 
to Wright (2010:122), some postmodernists even claim that 
ultimately we fail to obtain knowledge of reality because, at 
the end of the day, there is no such thing as reality, no actual 
order of things. The notion of reality exists only within our 
psychological conventions and linguistic contractions.2
Our contention
A possible solution to the problem of social and value 
disintegration due to political disruption and possibly also 
1.South Africans’ disorganisation and vulnerability have been compounded by their 
recent history: their struggle against apartheid has in many cases been characterised 
by lawlessness and anarchy; the post-apartheid regime has now been struggling for 
two decades to find its feet and to steady the political and social boat.
2.According to Wright (2010:123), these thinkers fall in the epistemic fallacy of 
confusing reality with knowledge of reality. We have no grounds to deny the 
existence of reality simply because it is beyond our intellectual powers to fully 
comprehend it.
the postmodern spirit of the times is to pertinently educate the 
upcoming generations about the nature of the social contract 
into which they as citizens of the country have entered 
because of living in the territory of an independent state 
with a legitimate government and a particular social order. 
This contention will be defended by drawing attention to the 
following facets of the problem: a brief outline of the concept 
‘social contract’; a discussion of the tolerance of others and 
their differences; the nature of the social contract specifically 
in South Africa, and of the educational imperatives flowing 
from these outlines and discussions.
Social contract: Theoretical perspective
The earliest proponents of the social contract, Socrates and 
Plato, sought to provide a rational perspective of what is 
necessary to achieve a state which the members of a society 
can depend upon to living well. Originally conceived 
as a normative theory of moral and political obligations 
determined by an understood contract and incumbent upon 
members of a society, this theory has been debated over the 
centuries since (cf. Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia n.d.:1–1). 
Nonetheless, as Byerly (2013:5) has noted, it endures and, 
for more modern purposes, has been extended to include 
not only society and government, but also business. Its basic 
premise is still the same: to understand and determine what 
roles, relationships and responsibilities each citizen has 
relative to the whole of society and its collective well-being. 
Thomas Hobbes (in the Leviathan 1651) and John Locke first 
actually formulated it as a formal theory by which people 
are said to have abandoned the ‘state of nature’ to form a 
more organised and just society. They assumed that people 
at first lived in a state where there was no organisation or 
government. Hobbes maintained that by the social contract 
people had surrendered their natural liberties in order to 
enjoy the order and safety of the organised state, whereas 
Locke made the social contract the basis of his advocacy of 
popular sovereignty, the idea that the government must 
reflect the will of the people. 
Like Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in Le contrat social (1762), 
found in the general will a means of establishing reciprocal 
rights and duties, privileges and responsibilities as the basis 
of a state. Similar ideas were used as a justification for both 
the American and the French revolutions in the 18th century. 
Thomas Jefferson, for instance, held that the preservation 
of certain natural rights was an essential part of the social 
contract; consent of the governed was fundamental to any 
exercise of governmental power. 
In brief, the social contract is the hypothesis that human 
beings, as they came together to live in communities and 
society, thus encountering interdependencies, must reach 
a common agreement regarding the relationships and 
responsibilities and rights of that society’s members. It 
represents an implied contract, agreement or covenant by 
which individuals are said to have abandoned their ‘natural 
state’ and its freedoms to form the more organised society in 
which they now live (Byerly 2013:6).
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Peaceful coexistence (a positive modus vivendi) and tolerance 
in a community or a society depend on a social contract 
amongst the members of such a community.  The contract 
therefore should provide room for diverse positions 
in society; it emerges from a joint decision of rational 
individuals. Antecedent to a social contract there are no 
principles of justice or agreement about expectations in force. 
Put differently, the emergence of a social contract amongst 
individuals who widely differ from one another in terms of 
background, religion, culture, customs and habits leads to a 
well-ordered society, to the well-being of all the contracting 
parties and to social justice for all concerned (Strauss 
2009:510–511). Following Rousseau, Rawls (2007:566–571) 
states that government is based on a social contract amongst 
free, equal and rational persons entering into a contract 
based on the principle of justice as fairness and for the well-
being of all concerned. The contract leads to the adoption of 
certain rights and duties and to the measuring out of benefits 
for everyone. 
Bower’s (2005) assessment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America gives an idea of what a social contract 
could mean for all. That Constitution:
is nothing if not a repository of human values [which] had 
a profoundly beneficial effect on the development of civil 
society, on the emergence of a trustworthy judiciary and on the 
achievement of freedom …. (pp. 226, 228)
Part of the social contract is also common law which, in his 
opinion, governs the affairs and relationships of people. 
Nussbaum (2000:5) adds to this that all governments should 
adhere to those principles that a minimum of respect for 
human dignity requires. The contract should therefore 
provide for treating each person as an end and none as a tool 
of others. According to Robeyns (2005:passim), the capabilities 
approach worked out by Nussbaum and Sen forms a 
broad normative framework for what has been referred to 
above as a social contract.  Sen (2010:245, 247) concurs by 
saying that it would be hard to understand why and how 
a person undertakes some of his or her activities without 
comprehension of his or her societal relations. Individual 
human beings, with their various plural identities, multiple 
applications and diverse associations, are quintessentially 
social creatures with different types of societal interaction.
Tolerance as upshot of the social contract
After having looked at the nature and purpose of the social 
contract amongst individuals, we can now turn to the issue 
of tolerance in an educational context. The question is, 
who would be most willing and ready to enter into a social 
contract with others and hence be more tolerant of others 
and their views? To ask this question is more of an academic 
exercise than of practical significance since all of us, whether 
we wish to do so or not, are party to a social contract as 
embodied in the constitution of our countries and in the 
government of the day. By far the majority of us conform to 
the rules and stipulations of that contract, on the one hand 
because of understanding the benefits that might flow from 
the contract in terms of personal and communal well-being, 
justice and fairness, rights and duties, and, on the other hand, 
out of fear of punishment and social sanction. There have 
been incidents, however, caused by pathological dissidents, 
such as Timothy McVeigh responsible for the Oklahoma 
Bombing and Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the 
Norway massacre, who do not accept the authority vested 
in the government of the day on the basis of a social contract, 
and hence wish to opt out.
The academic exercise has the value, however, of revealing 
something of the dynamics of cultural and religious tolerance 
in our present-day diverse societies. It can arguably be 
expected that those individuals who operate with relatively 
minimalist values (Swartz 2006:551–570), with a totally 
relativistic value system, will more readily enter into a social 
contract because they do not feel very strongly about their 
own value system. For this group, values are ‘just wonderful 
names with very little life and world view content’, as Zecha 
(2007:48–60) has remarked. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) 
developmental model, the members of this group arguably 
belong in either category IV – those who accept difference – 
or category V – those who adapt to difference – or category 
VI – those who integrate difference (Bennett 1993:7–11). A 
person in this group might be prepared to practise cultural 
and religious pluralism and/or dialogical pluralism, and 
may also be tolerant of others and their cultural and religious 
views. 
The obverse can also be expected. Those who operate with 
maximalist values (Swartz 2006:551–570) might be less willing 
to enter into a social contract because of their awareness 
of the deep value rifts that exist between themselves and 
others of different religious or cultural persuasion.  The 
more maximalist their value system, the less likely they will 
be to enter into such a contract. There is also the distinct 
possibility that those operating with a maximalist value 
system that borders on fundamentalism and fanaticism, 
those with a ‘toxic’ cultural and religious orientation, might 
refuse to enter into a social contract. Such destabilising 
tactics can be observed both internationally where terrorist 
groups, inspired by religious fervour, attempt to undermine 
the extant world order (11 September 2001 is emblematic of 
this attitude), and nationally, where religious groups attempt 
to destabilise the national order of their country (Mali and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo are at the time of 
publication suffering from such attempts).  The members 
of these groups might also be intolerant of the cultural and 
religious views of other groups which they regard as cultural 
and political enemies and as heathens. In terms of Bennett’s 
(1993) developmental model, this group might belong in 
category I – total denial of legitimate differences amongst 
people (totally exclusivist: only my culture and religion are 
true) or totally inclusivist (since only my culture and religion 
are true, I have to convert all others to it) – or category II – I 
have to defend myself against difference (Bennett 1993:1–3). 
The person with a balanced value orientation might fall into 
Bennett’s categories: 
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III – I feel the need to minimize the differences between 
myself and others; the differences between myself and 
others are not all that important; we can talk about them 
and exchange ideas – dialogical pluralism 
IV – acceptance of differences amongst people; people are 
different, and that is a fact of life, we have to live with it
V – adaptation to difference; although I have to live with 
the differences amongst people, I can be myself and apply 
my own value system in terms of the social contract to 
which I am party (Bennett 1993:3–7). 
The person with a balanced value system will conditionally 
enter into a social contract with others and meet the 
responsibilities of doing so.
Biblical perspective
For the purposes of evaluating the South African social 
contract (see next section) and for gleaning certain 
pedagogical guidelines from the above and following 
discussions we would prefer to approach the problem 
from a biblical perspective. Space does not allow a detailed 
discussion of a biblical societal relationship theory which will 
describe all the structures, roles and responsibilities of all the 
societal relationships involved in a particular social contract. 
We can only pay attention to the societal relationship that 
is most pertinently involved in the social contract in a 
particular territory, namely the citizenry or civil society of an 
internationally recognised state, territory or region. 
Analysis of the societal relationship3 that we refer to as the 
citizenry of a state reveals that it is historically founded – 
in other words, it came into being as a result of historical 
circumstances and formative, creative decisions by politicians 
and other individuals of historical significance. As a result 
of their negotiations, decisions and power plays, a state 
with demarcated boundaries came into being, causing all 
those within those boundaries to become the citizens of that 
particular state. A citizen’s presence within those boundaries 
causes him or her to become party to a social contract with 
all the other citizens within those boundaries. As a result 
of how the state historically came into being, they become 
subject to a certain set of rules, concretised in their country’s 
constitution, legal system and social rules of conduct. 
As a societal relationship, the citizenry has a dual destination 
or purpose: juridical and ethical. Its juridical purpose is 
to democratically elect a government, to subject itself to 
the constitution and the other laws promulgated by that 
government and to generally contribute to law and order, to 
be productive and responsible members of the state, to respect 
others and to look after their own and others’ interests. Like 
all societal relationships, the citizenry of a country also has 
an ethical purpose. Mention has already been made of the 
fact that the citizens of a country should care for the interests 
of all other citizens, but the ethical purpose of a citizenry 
goes further than mere caring; a societal relationship is also – 
perhaps mainly – founded on trust.
3.The following few paragraphs contain the authors’ theory about civil society based 
on the societal relationship theory pioneered by H. Dooyeweerd, D.F.M. Strauss, 
P.G. Schoeman and others. 
In an ideal world we could have expected the biblical norm 
of love of and service to one’s neighbour to have been 
applicable. Not only should each citizen in such an ideal 
world love the triune God of the Bible with his or her whole 
heart (Mt 22:37–39; Mk 12:28–34), but also their fellow citizens 
as they love themselves (Mt 7:12; Rm 12:9–12; 2 Cor 1:1–3; 1 
Pt 3:8–12). They should accept one another in love (Rm 15:7; 
Gl 5:13), act in the interests of one another (Rm 15:2), bear 
one another’s burdens (Gl 6:2), build one another by focusing 
on the others’ strong points (Phlp 2–3), should conduct 
constructive communication (Eph 4:29), and generally make 
their love of others visible through their actions (1 Jn 4:12). 
The Bible abounds with ‘one another’ injunctions (love one 
another – Jn 15:17; show respect towards others – Rm 12:10; 
do not judge one another – Rm 14:15; instruct one another – 
Rm 15:4, Cl 3:16; greet one another – 2 Cl 13:12, to mention 
only a few). However, it would be unrealistic to expect the 
citizenry of a country to live in accordance with biblical 
rules and injunctions such as these because of the multi-
cultural and multi-religious composition of the citizenries of 
the world. The best that can be hoped for is that the diverse 
populations of the various countries of the world should 
strive for peaceful coexistence (a peaceful modus vivendi) 
based on the ethical principles of trust and the Golden Rule.
According to Ariely (2010:127–128), the social contract 
amongst the citizens of a country is based on trust, which is 
why people get so upset when the contract is violated, and 
why they are willing to spend time and money on punishing 
the offenders. In saying this, he echoes a sentiment of Wright 
(2009:413) who avers that a modus vivendi is ‘a problem 
of trust’. The smooth running of a society is sustainable in 
the long run only if there is a fair degree of trust within the 
citizenry, and between the government and the governed; 
trust frees a country of corruption and crime, the citizens 
are generally healthy and free of stress, and a sense of justice 
prevails at large. A good civil society, according to Ilbury 
and Sunter (2011:73), can be built only on the basis of the 
following four-way test: Is what is being said and done the 
truth? Is it fair to all concerned? Will it build goodwill and 
better relationships? Will it be beneficial to all concerned? All 
of these questions are an echo of Francis Fukuyama’s (1996) 
thesis: each citizen of a country should be:
motivated by something broader than individual self-interest. … 
in all successful economic societies these communities are united 
by trust (…) The ability to associate depends … on the degree 
to which communities share norms and values and are able to 
subordinate individual interests to those of larger groups. Out of 
such shared values comes trust ... (pp. 9–11)
References to reciprocity, moral obligation, duty, caring 
about the interests of others and trust bring us to the second 
ethical principle, namely the Golden Rule as the basis of a 
social contract. Whereas the biblical Golden Rule of loving 
your neighbour as yourself (Mt 22:37–39; Mk 12: 28–34), but 
also your fellow citizens (Mt 7:12; Rm 12:9–12; 2 Cor 1:1–3; 
1 Pt 3:8–12), would be paramount in a Christian society, it 
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would be unreasonable – as observed above – to expect the 
same from secular–humanist societies, that is, societies not 
in any way bound by the principles of a particular religion 
or by the tenets of a particular religious organisation.4 
Even in such secular societies, however, we find that the 
citizenry are being exhorted to subject themselves to some 
or other version of the Golden Rule. This ethical rule 
comes in many forms. Confucius (551 BC – 479 BC), for 
instance, said that the paramount virtue is ren (a sensitive 
concern for others), and he summarised this rule roughly 
as Hillel later would crystallise the Jewish Torah: ‘Do not 
do to others what you would not wish for yourself’ (Alford 
2009:53; Wright 2009:237). Confucius also simply said: ‘Love 
your fellow man’. Originally, this rule had only national 
application; only a generation later, the Chinese philosopher 
Mozi went further and explicitly advocated love of all 
humankind. Confucius also said: ‘The wise man is attracted 
to benevolence (ren) because he finds it to his advantage’ 
(see Wright 2009:237–238).
In India, Buddhist scripture had this to say: ‘Let none cajole 
or flout / his fellow anywhere; / let none wish others harm 
/ in dudgeon or in hate’ (Wright 2009:237). Comte-Sponville 
(2005:7–8) presents this norm in different terms: ‘You want 
to know whether an act is virtuous or reprehensible? Ask 
yourself what life would be like if everyone behaved as 
you do’. To be moral is to submit to a law which we all 
believe applies or should apply to all. This, he says, is the 
substance of the Kantian categorical imperative: ‘Act only on 
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal rule’. According to Valenkamp 
(pers. comm.., 08 March 2011), Kant’s categorical imperative 
should not be confused with the Golden Rule of ‘that which 
you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to others’. The 
Golden Rule is a hypothetical imperative since it does not 
strive at reaching a goal that is completely subjective, and 
focuses on the person who formulates that goal, namely the 
avoidance of things, events, circumstances and attitudes that 
one does not want to do. Kant aims at obligatory imperatives 
that fall outside the ambit of subjective will, opinion, feeling 
and loving. He therefore bases his view of morality and 
social justice in something that transcends the will; that 
is, beyond the wishes and desires of individuals and also 
beyond coincidence. 
Kant’s categorical imperative ties in with what Rousseau 
referred to as the ‘sublime maxim’: ‘Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you’.5 It also corresponds to the 
spirit of compassion formulated by Rousseau: ‘Do good to 
yourself with as little possible harm to others’. This rule was 
later echoed in J.S. Mill’s ‘harm principle’ (Morton 1998:170).
Ilbury and Sunter (2011:237) offer a more modern version of 
the rule, which they refer to in military terms as the ‘rules 
4.We find exceptions to this rule in certain Muslim countries, where the rules of 
a particular religion and of a particular religious organisation or system are also 
strictly applied in public life.
5.This same maxim appears in a mosaic in the building of the United Nations: ‘As ye 
would that men should do to you do ye also to them likewise’ (Clancy 1999:156).
of engagement’: normative rules are the moral rules of the 
game; they are one’s conscience. They are the rules that, 
if adhered to, demonstrate a noble sense of purpose that 
everyone respects. Break them, and you lose the badge of 
honour in a second. The interesting thing about all these 
versions of the Golden Rule, according to Comte-Sponville 
(2005:7), is that the Rule applies only in the first person 
singular but it applies universally, in other words, to every 
human being (every human being is an ‘I’). When an ‘I’ acts, 
it is not only a matter of personal preference or individual 
taste; it is essentially a question of the survival of – and the 
dignity of – society as a whole, of humanity, of civilisation.
To return to the core of the argument: In a world governed by 
biblical principles one could have expected the social contract 
according to which the citizenry of a country conducted 
their lives and existence to have been guided by the biblical 
Golden Rule of loving the Lord, and all other people as much 
as the self. However, since we do not live in such a world and 
in fact have to conduct our existence in societies dominated 
by secular and humanistic values, we have to resort to the 
two ethical principles of trust and two rather more secular 
versions of the Golden Rule. When we now turn to an analysis 
of the South African secular–humanist6 social contract, we 
shall have to concentrate on these two aspects.
The South African social contract
Official South African documents embody a formulation 
of values: in the Constitution, the common law, a series of 
promulgated Bills, a Bill of Human Rights, manifestos and 
policies. They represent the absolute minimum value system 
that a group of people or a community such as a nation or 
a profession can live with without arguing too much about 
what they mean when formulating each value. In essence, 
they form the basis of a social contract since they express 
the general consensus and trust (Ariely 2010:127–128) that 
had been gained during negotiations. According to Smith 
and Oosthuizen (2011:7), it represents a vision, based on 
compromise, of the society that is worthy of the steadfast 
commitment of everyone. In the words of Currie and De 
Waal (2010:32), this commitment is an indirect application of 
values: the Bill of Rights establishes an ‘objective normative 
value system’, a set of values that must be respected whenever 
the common law or legislation is interpreted, developed or 
applied.
In many cases, it is up to legal authorities such as courts of 
law as protectors of the rights of citizens to interpret what 
exactly a certain value means in a certain society or in 
certain conditions (De Vos 2011; Schreiner 2005:6; Wright 
6.The post–1994 South African social configuration can be regarded as secular since 
it is in no way connected to principles propounded by any particularist religion nor 
any church or any other religious institution. It is interesting to note that a former 
Minister of Education did not regard the South African situation as secular because, 
as he argued at the time, Government did not turn its back on religion or religious 
institutions but saw a place for it in civil life, particularly with respect to its policy 
on religion in education. In his own words: ‘We do not have a state religion. But 
our country is not a secular state where there is a very strict separation between 
religion and the state’ (Republic of South Africa 2003). Put differently, the South 
African government follows a cooperative model between state and religion/
religious organisations.
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2009:54–59). In this process, they contribute to the formulation 
of common law.
What, in a nutshell, is the content of the social contract that 
South Africans have agreed to in the past 20 years? In the first 
place, the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996, section 7 of the Bill of 
Rights, Republic of South Africa) entrenches the democratic 
rights of human dignity, equality and freedom. The pertinent 
affirmation of these three values makes them pivotal points of 
the Bill of Rights.  From them flow the essential fundamental 
rights of equality, civilian freedom and human dignity. The 
value of human dignity in particular has often been affirmed 
by the High Court of South Africa to be the mother of all 
other rights, such as equality and non-discrimination. Section 
10 of the Constitution also specifically affirms the value of 
the inherent human dignity of each and every citizen: each 
person is born as a human being, entitled to dignity that 
is equal to that of everybody else, irrespective of gender, 
creed, race, age, nationality, marital status, ethnicity, culture, 
language or religion. Non-respect for this value amounts to 
unfair discrimination, in contravention of section 9 of the Bill 
of Rights. Freedom has likewise been confirmed as a positive 
constitutional right: every person is free from all forms of 
violence, torture and insecurity and is entitled to freedom 
of religion, belief, thought, opinion, expression, association, 
movement, occupation or profession.
Educating about the social contract
It is clear from the above (South African) example that 
societies, as defined, tend to plan their structures and 
functioning on the basis of a social contract which embodies 
a number of core rights. The South African social contract 
entails agreements about a society based on the rule of 
law (the Constitution is the supreme law to which all 
behaviour and actions are subject), on the recognition of the 
fundamental and universally recognised rights of individuals 
(and via individuals or groups, including minorities), and 
on adherence to other laws, including those regarding 
education, in so far as they flow from and concur with the 
Constitution of the country.
The South African Ministry of Education (2001) realised 
that the basic tenets of the social contract, as outlined in 
the previous section, had to be taught to the learners in the 
schools, hence the publication of its Manifesto on democracy, 
values and education. A perusal of this Manifesto shows 
that the Ministry has selected ten core values with which 
learners should become intimately acquainted for South 
African society to move forward in a democratic, peaceful, 
dignified, trustful, respectful (loving) and prosperous 
manner. However, as we have also seen, this effort has so far 
not had the desired effect, hence the appeal to educators and 
educationists to make a renewed effort to acquaint, through 
education, the learners with the notion of the social contract 
that South Africans agreed to in the years 1994–1996, with the 
advent of the new democratic South Africa. The current amount 
of violence in the country attests to the distinct possibility 
that the ‘free borns’ (i.e. those born after 1994, who are now 
18 or 19 years old) have not succeeded in fully grasping 
what the South African social contract entails, which seems 
to suggest that the Manifesto has so far not had the desired 
effect. To avoid producing yet another generation of ‘free 
borns’ ignorant of their social contract, school education in 
South Africa should now be purposely focused on bringing 
the implications of the South African social contract home 
to the children currently at school. Only through doing that 
will the current violence be curbed and hopefully eradicated. 
(The same applies to all other countries and societies where 
violence still is the order of the day.)
Conclusion
The fact of social disintegration in South Africa (and 
elsewhere) has forced us once again to look at the nature and 
contents of the social contract that the South African citizenry 
has entered into, voluntarily or not. In secular states, the 
social contract cannot be expected to be grounded in biblical 
ethical principles; it should, however, at the very least be 
rooted in two ethical principles that are widely recognised 
even in secular–humanist societies, namely trust and certain 
secular and humanistic versions of the Golden Rule. A 
positive modus vivendi could flow from the recognition and 
application of these two principles. The younger generations 
should be educated to understand all these principles: the 
nature and content of their social contract, the two ethical 
principles on which the social contract should ideally be 
based, and the need for a modus vivendi based on their 
particular social contract.
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